Hegel, Dubois and the American School of Slavery

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Abstract

The present paper looks into the redeployment of Hegel’s philosophy of history in DuBois’s The Souls of Black Folk (1903) in response to the American revisionist school of slavery in the Progressive Age (1900-1917). It seeks to explore DuBois’s clash with the white Progressives over the interpretation of the German philosopher’s ideas about slavery and the destiny of ethnic groups in the United States.

This paper investigates the Hegelian dimension of William Edward Burghardt DuBois’s The Souls of Black Folk (1903) with reference to his conception of Black American history. To date a spate of articles and book-length studies written from various perspectives has been produced about this Black American classic. However, apart from sparse hints here and there about the influence that Georg Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) exerted on DuBois’s writing, to my best knowledge there is no sustained study about how DuBois (1869-1963) re-tools and redeployed Hegel’s philosophy of history in defence of Black Americans during the Progressive Age (1900-1917). This critical oversight is not unique to

Résumé

Cet article est une étude sur le redéploiement de la philosophie de l’histoire de Hegel dans l’œuvre de DuBois intitulé The Souls of Black Folk (1903), et ce en réplique à l’école révisionniste de l’histoire de l’esclavage durant la période Progressiste (1900-1917). Il explore le désaccord sur l’interprétation des idées du philosophe allemand sur l’esclavage et la destinée des différents groupes ethniques aux Etats-Unis.
scholarly studies of DuBois’s work. Indeed, despite the fact that Frantz Fanon provided insights into the Hegelian nature of Black American thought in *Black Skin White Masks* as early as 1954, Black Studies have only reluctantly researched it. It has to be observed that Black Studies were incorporated as academically recognised disciplines in American Universities as a result of the Civil Rights Movement in the mid-1960s.

The Progressive Age in American historiography is known as the age of reform of the excesses of the Gilded Age, an age marked by an industrial take-off resulting in reckless urbanisation, increasing floods of immigration, and uncontrolled corruption at all levels of society and government. For Black historians, the period of the Progressive Age is commonly referred to as the Jim Crow Era. This appellation is due to the exclusion of Black Americans from the political and civil life of mainstream society through the annulment of the civil rights gained during the Civil War (1860-1865) and the Reconstruction period (1866-1876) following the *entente cordiale* between the North and the South in 1876. The *entente* was the “strange fruit” of political merchandising over the returns of the 1876 presidential election. This election finished in a tie between the Republican Party candidate Rutherford Birchard Hayes and the Democratic Party candidate Samuel Tilden. In exchange for the withdrawal of federal troops from the South, which was practically under military occupation of the North for 15 years, the Democratic Party conceded the Presidential seat to the Republican candidate. This victory in seeming defeat of the Democratic Party meant a return to power of the descendants of the old slavocracy in the New South. While slavery was officially abolished in 1863, the freedmen were brought through terror of the Klu Klux Klan and through segregating and racist legislation to accept the status of second-class citizen.

The racist exclusion of Black Americans from mainstream society found its legitimacy in various academic disciplines in the New South. For example, Southern writers like Thomas Nelson Page celebrated the old plantation life and the brotherly reunion of the South and the North. Apart from sealing the historic reconciliation between the North and the South, Southern literature was written with one political aim in mind, to prevent the South from being “arraigned [for the second time in American history] at the bar of the world without an advocate and without defence,” for reducing their Black nationals to a new slavery. (Page quoted in Donnarae MacCann, 2001: 124) In terms
of historiography, the Post-Reconstruction period witnessed the birth of a revisionist school of American history, absolving the ante-bellum South from the sin of slavery now credited as a school for civilising Black slaves. I would argue that this accreditation of the American school of slavery was given credence by the works of Hegel. According to Elizabeth Flower and Murray G. Murphey (1977), Hegel’s Philosophy of the State and of History appeared in an translated American version in 1887. This version represents some sort of philosophical primer by a St. Louis Hegelian whose name is George Sylvester Morris.

Hegel wrote that “the only essential connection that has existed and continued to exist between Negroes and the Europeans is slavery. [...] Slavery is itself a phase of advance from the merely isolated sensual existence – a phase of education – a mode of becoming participant in a higher morality and the culture connected with it.” (1971:98-99)Such claims by Hegel were all grist to the mill for the American school of slavery. Caught in the racist web of historical thought characteristic of their time, the white Progressives enlisted Hegel to exclude Black Americans from the various reforms—such as in housing, education, and health—on the pretext that they were historically and culturally retarded. It was against this racist historical background that DuBois wrote The Souls of Black Folk. The book comprises fourteen chapters in the form of essays, biographies, autobiographies and elegies in which DuBois seeks to debunk the myths of the Black man’s cultural inferiority by engaging in a dialectic re-reading/ re-writing of Hegel’s Philosophy of History, the philosophical source from which the American school of slavery and white Progressives drew their ideological ammunitions. Having followed his education for two years, from 1883 to 1884, in the University of Berlin, the very University at which Hegel taught before becoming its chancellor, DuBois like many of his white Progressives fellows, became extremely knowledgeable about Hegel’s philosophy. In this essay, I would contend that DuBois’s knowledge of the German master’s work was so profound that he managed not only to turn its major historical tenets upside down but also to refurbish and redeploy the Hegelian methodology and themes in support of the Black man’s full entry into mainstream society.

Before moving to the discussion of this redeployment, a few words about Hegel’s work are in order. Though The Philosophy of History is the one work of Hegel to be published posthumously by his son, it had
the most profound influence, for better or worse, on later philosophers, notably Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. These Marxist thinkers appreciated most the serious dimension that Hegel accorded to the notion of change and dialectic development throughout history. In the preface to the second edition of *Das Capital*, Marx called himself “a pupil of that might thinker,” and in recognition of Hegel’s importance to the Marxist thought, Engels wrote that “what distinguished Hegel’s mode of thinking was the exceptional historical sense underlying it.” (Quoted in Singer Pinter, 2001: 13) Many decades later, T. S. Eliot had the same praise for Hegel’s historical sense when he wrote his critical essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” (1932) We know that Left and Right Hegelians differed significantly in their retooling of the German master’s ideas. However, there is a relevant point to be drawn from their agreement about the importance of Hegel as both a historicist and cultural critic. This agreement among Hegelian thinkers across ideological boards rests on the basis of Hegel’s strong belief that world history has a meaning and that development in culture and history brings out a concomitant development of freedom. These are the two main Hegelian principles that DuBois made his own in writing *The Souls of Black Folk*.

History, for Hegel, is not that Shakespearean or rather Macbethian “tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.” On the contrary, he lets us know that the world is not abandoned to chance and external contingent courses. Things happen with a purpose. Without completely doing away the religious or divine understanding of this purpose, Hegel claims that the meaning of history reveals itself most through our reflection on or philosophising about our past as human beings. This reflection indicates the direction history is taking and the destination it will ultimately reach. Hegel clearly states the direction and destination of human history by defining world or Universal History as “the exhibition of spirit in the process of working the knowledge of that which it is potentially.” (1991: 17-18) For him the essence of spirit or the mind is freedom. What distinguishes humankind from his natural environment is the capacity to activate that potential for freedom. Therefore, Hegel concludes by postulating that “The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom.” (Ibid, p.19)

On the basis of this postulate, Hegel distinguishes three different stages in the development of freedom. In stage one, only one man is
free and that is the oriental despot. In stage two, some people are free and some other others are not. This was the case in the Ancient Greek world. In stage three that corresponds to the modern era all people are free. The dialectical progress in freedom happens as a result of contact between what he calls “world historical peoples.” For him, the “Negroes” in Africa have a degree zero of consciousness of freedom. So, he skips over Africa’s role in history and moves on to the discussion of the oriental world. Even here, Hegel differentiates between Chinese and Indian cultures on the one hand, and Persian and Egyptian ones on the other. The former two “cultures” have no credentials of freedom whatever to show on the historical board in order to admit their peoples among world historical peoples. The Chinese “culture” organises the government and the state on the principle of the family, whereas the Indian one does so on the principle of castes. In both cases, the concept of individual freedom is missing. In the Chinese society, the Emperor stands in the position of father to whom all others owe natural obedience as children and wards of the state. In India, by contrast, people’s occupations and behaviours are externally determined by caste.

Hegel comes to the conclusion that the birthplace of the consciousness of freedom has to be located elsewhere in the oriental world than in China and India. It is in Persia that he identifies the germ destined to flower into the idea of freedom. The basis of the Persian empire is not merely natural obedience to family and caste, but a higher principle derived from the religion of Zoroaster, which involves the worship of light. As an Enlightenment thinker, it is not surprising that Hegel makes much of this intellectual and spiritual principle by declaring the Persian culture and society as the first starting point in the growth of the consciousness of freedom. However, this potential of freedom could not be realised in Persia because of the despotic nature of its regime. Therefore, when the latter collapsed in its confrontation with the Greek city-states in Salamis in 480 B.C, the second stage in the dialectical development in the consciousness of freedom could at last start. As world historical peoples, the Greeks and the Romans expanded the limits of freedom before handing the torch to the Germanic people who inaugurated the third stage in the development of the consciousness of freedom with the Reformation.

Hegel sees “simplicity” and “heart” as the two main principles in the character of the German nation and people, which “predestined
them to be the bearers of the Christian principles, and to carry out the Idea as the Absolutely Rational aim.” (Ibid, p.354) In other words, if Reformation took root in the German world and not elsewhere, it is because its character provided a congenial ground for the growth of the ideas of that simple German monk, Martin Luther. One of these ideas is that people do not need the church or any outside authority to tell them how to interpret the scripture. Each individual human being has, in his/her own heart, a direct spiritual relationship with Christ. Hegel saw the Reformation as more than an “attack on the old Church and the replacement of Roman Catholicism by Protestantism.” (Singer, p.26) Its political and social consequences were also tremendous. It prompted German people on the path of striving for creating a world fit for spiritual beings, a democratic and rational world where all men feel at home at last because its laws are in harmony with their rational nature. Hegel does not state it explicitly, but the drift of his arguments suggests that the Germany of his time was representative of what an Ethical state based on freedom ought to be.

However, he also seems to admit a possible future development in the consciousness of freedom when he refers to America as “the land of the future, where in the ages that lie before us, the burden of the World’s History shall reveal itself.” (Hegel, p.86) Hegel devotes only five pages to America as another possible site or stage in the development of the Idea of freedom, because “What has taken place in the New World up to the present time is only an echo of the Old World – the expression of a foreign life.” (p. 87) Hegel adds that as land of the future, America “has no interest for us here [The Philosophy of History], for as regards History, our concern must be with that which has been and that which is.” (87) When Hegel made this claim, America was still in the infant stages of national existence. With The Declaration of Independence, The Articles of Confederation and The Constitution in mind, Hegel suggests that America was at that stage a civil society operating on a mere liberal and contractual basis. As long as the safety-valve of the Frontier was open, he prophesied, a loose liberal government would be enough and the necessity for a firm combination would not be felt. In anticipation of the historical development of America in the late nineteenth century, he wrote the following:

A real State [meaning an Ethical and rational state that goes beyond the principles of liberalism] arises only after a
distinction of classes has arisen, when wealth and poverty become extreme, and when such a condition of things presents itself that a large proportion of the people can no longer satisfy its necessities in the way in which it has been accustomed so to do. But America is hitherto exempt from this pressure, for it has the outlet of colonization constantly and widely open, and multitudes are continually streaming into the plains of the Mississippi. (pp.85-86)

What Hegel says about world history in general and America in particular could have hardly failed to resound strongly in the ears of the Progressives at the end of the nineteenth century. This was particularly true for DuBois in *The Souls of Black Folk.*

DuBois echoes Hegel’s historicist ideas throughout his work, but he makes them more vibrant in the first three chapters (“Of our Spiritual Strivings,” “Of the Dawn of Freedom,” and “Of Mr Booker T. Washington”) than the other eleven chapters of the book. The first chapter establishes the African American people as a world historical people. The author starts with autobiographical details related to his first experience of racism as a schoolchild in New England and his response to that experience in negative as well as positive forms, but soon the elements of personal life are enlarged to include all African Americans in a broader world historical framework. In a poetic flight reminiscent of Hegel in *The Philosophy of History,* he tells the reader that

> After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world, -- a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double consciousness, this sense of always looking through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness – an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. (p.215)

The sequential alignment in the quote makes it clear that DuBois takes Hegel’s word for it. For Hegel as well as for DuBois America is the land of the future. But swerving from the former the latter affirms that
because of historical circumstances it is the Negro who was destined to take over the world historical role for expanding the consciousness of freedom further in the land of the future.

A return to Hegel’s text is necessary to grasp the full meaning of DuBois’s reversal of the march of world history. Hegel dismisses Africa as being unworthy of consideration in a study of history like his. The main reason for this dismissal is that “It is the “land of childhood, which lying beyond the day of self-conscious history, is enveloped in the dark mantle of Night.” (Ibid, p. 91) To exclude Africa from the scene of world history, Hegel appealed to the ethnographic writings of his time for evidence. The worship of fetishes, the weakness of character and moral sentiments (e.g., parents selling their children to slavery), and the absence of government are some of the elements from ethnography that Hegel holds against "Negroes" in his declaration that freedom in the sense of self-consciousness is totally unknown to them. DuBois makes a clean sweep of these racial prejudices first by investing the term “Negro” with a positive sense and then making him the potential carrier of that future human project that Hegel set in America. The author’s qualification of the Negro as “the seventh son” of the human family is meant to add force to the Negro’s destiny to lead history in the direction of an expanded freedom. African American tradition invests “the seventh son born with a veil” with visionary powers. “The last will be the first,” says the Bible, and DuBois prophesies the same for the Negro when he reviews the progress of world history.

DuBois’s reversal of the Hegelian schema for the dialectical development of history seems to rest on some ambiguities in Hegel’s historical text that recent critics like Caroline Rooney have detected. For example, the latter affirms that there are many ambiguous elements in Hegel’s statements about Africa and the Negro which suggest that for him the cultural Other for the West is not Africa but the Orient. (Rooney, 2000: 162) DuBois seems to have exploited the German master’s ambiguities, contradictions and other textual weaknesses to weave out his own version of world history. For instance, one sees no striking difference in Hegel’s qualification of Africa as a “land of childhood” and America as “the land of the future”. Moreover, the cultural contradictions that he detects in the two regions are more or less similar. They are even more striking in the case of the latter. Though he affirms that America is “the land of the future,” he nips the idea in the bud when he makes America look
as an imitation of old Europe, and particularly Britain. The implication is easy to draw for DuBois particularly in the context of the materialist America of his period. Throughout the book, DuBois reminds us of the seamy sides of American materialism while pointing to the spiritual dimension of Black American life even when lived within the “veil” or what Hegel calls the “mantle of darkness.”

This is one of the ironic variations that DuBois plays on Hegel’s conception of the progress of world history. Hegel believes that slavery is unjust and indefensible in civilised societies, except for the Negro for whom slavery is a school of freedom. The European or rather American enslavement of the Negro constitutes the ideal way of bringing him into world history. The irony in DuBois’s text is that it is the Negro, the man unjustly declared to be outside history, who has the spiritual wherewithal to make Americans, regardless of their race, enter world history. DuBois reverses the direction of the progress of world history as laid down by Hegel. It is the Negro (the term is appropriated by DuBois in its positive sense) who is regarded as the culminating point of world history. The Negro as portrayed by DuBois represents the Hegelian dialectic man *par excellence*. It is worth observing here that apart from the sociological interpretation, the Hegelian dialectic of the slave and the master has received a socio-psychological interpretation which makes the struggle of the bondsman with the master as an internal dialectic that influences and is influenced by the social dialectic outside. According to Hegel, the ego is “we”, i.e., a plurality of Ego, just as “we” is a single ego. The following interpretation of Hegel’s dialectic by George Armstrong Kelly captures the complexity of DuBois’s Double Consciousness as an operational concept for self-definition:

Lordship and bondage is properly seen from three angles that are equally valid and interpenetrable. One of these angles is necessarily the social, of which Kojève has given such a dazzling reading. Another regards the shifting pattern of psychological domination and servitude within the individual. The third then becomes a fusion of the other two processes: the interior consequences wrought by the external confrontation of the Self and the Other, the Other and the Self, which has commenced in the struggle for recognition. (Kelly George Armstrong, 1993:165)
I would argue that Armstrong’s triangular vision of Hegel’s dialectic, and particularly the third angle, highlights DuBois’s double consciousness as a fusion, a synthesis of social/historical and psychological processes.

DuBois represents the Negro as a man who has traversed the fourth stage of the Hegelian journey towards self-consciousness: stoicism, scepticism, introspection and transcendence of negative urges. The last stage for Hegel is reached once the “self sees itself in the other.” It is probably what DuBois means when he refers to that “peculiar sensation of seeing oneself through the ideas of the other.” (p.215) DuBois takes care to underline that “the history of the American Negro is the history of this strife – this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self.” Therefore, while Bruce D. Dickson (1999) and Arnold Rampersad (1999) are arguably right to claim that DuBois borrows the concept of “double consciousness” from literary and medical sources (European Romanticism, American transcendentalism and nineteenth-century medical literature related to cases of split personality), they seem to be mistaken in relating the synthesis that DuBois made between the two-halves of personality to guidelines from William James, DuBois’s tutor of philosophy at Harvard University. As the following message to his brother the famous novelist Henry James indicates, William James himself seems to have been surprised at DuBois’s pulling together of two dissociated selves into a harmonious entity: “I am sending you a decidedly moving book by a mulatto ex-student of mine, DuBois, professor of history at Atlanta (Georgia) Negro college. Read Chapters VII to XI for local color, etc.(June 6, 1903).” (Quoted in Louis Jr and Hume, 227) William James was too much involved in the medical literature of his time to be able to provide his ex-student with any guidance on how to reconcile a racially divided self. Moreover, knowing William James’s strong objection to Hegel’s dialectic method, one wonders how he could have raised in his writings suggestions of this kind to DuBois. (Richard, 29-38 and William, 43-62). Therefore, if one has to look into the source of inspiration behind DuBois’s synthesis, it is not in James’s pragmatic philosophy that one can find it but in Hegel’s idealist philosophy.

For DuBois the Negro is not a negative starting point, ground zero, as Hegel may call it, but the end point of Western history in its contact with Africa. The African slave becomes a Negro on the American soil, a Negro who takes consciousness of himself and stands in an
antithetical position to the one that Hegel portrays in *The Philosophy of World History*. The Negro, as DuBois portrays him, is “gifted with second-sight in this American world.” He is not a mere biological entity, but a man with a spiritual message, an Idea to transmit to human kind. Without going into detail, DuBois locates the original source of the Negro’s spirituality to that African part of the world, which Hegel had excluded from world history. DuBois tells us that African priests catered to the spiritual needs of their folks in the African forests. Like other Africans, these African priests were reduced to slavery. However, they never ceased to provide a spiritual direction for their people even in the house of bondage. Christianity shaped them, but they also shaped it by creating Churches built on African forms of worship.

The “Negro” in DuBois’s sense of the word has both a singular and generic meaning. In its generic sense, it stands for the black race. Indeed, the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries were marked by a resurgence of theories about race. If DuBois uses the term race to speak about the Negro, he often uses it not in its biological and anthropological sense, but as a socio-historical notion. For him, what matters most are not the “grosser physical differences of color, hair and bone” of the Negro, but the “differences –subtle, delicate and elusive, though they may be –which have silently but definitely separated men into groups.” (Ibid, p.816) Following Hegel, DuBois claims that the “history of the world is the history not of individuals, but of groups, not of nations, but of race.” (Ibid, 817) Accordingly, he distinguishes “eight distinctively differentiated races, in the sense in which History tells us the word must be used.” (Ibid, p.817) He names them as follows: the Slavs, the Teutons, the English, the Negroes, the Romance race, the Semites, the Hindus and the Mongolians.

There is no need here to discuss the basis on which DuBois has differentiated between the races. The interest is rather in his statement that each of the various races is “striving […] in its own way, to develop for civilization its particular message, its particular ideal, which shall help to guide the world nearer and nearer that perfection of human life for which we all long, that “one far off Divine event” (Ibid, 819). It has to be observed that, for Hegel, the history of mankind is the history of the spirit. The spirit realises itself in history through particular racial groups. For him, world history seems to have reached its consummation or end in his own times, i.e., modern
Germany. Dubois’s *The Souls of Black Folk* opens with a chapter (Of Our Spiritual Strivings) with the rejection of this Hegelian contention that history has completed its testing of human groups, and it closes with the denunciation of human arrogance in its announcement of the end of history. While DuBois accepts the Hegelian notion of spirit as a clearly definable measure of human advancement and backwardness, he castigates

…the silently growing assumption of this age[...] that the probation of races is past, and that the backward races of today are of proven inefficiency and not worth the saving. Such an assumption is the arrogance of peoples irreverent toward Time and the deeds of men.” (p.386)

In the previous quote DuBois comes back to the idea of the historical necessity for the conservation of races to which the Anglo-Saxon school of history like Josiah Strong were firmly opposed. The latter advocated the dispossessions, assimilation and melding of the so-called weaker races as a primary condition for the success of any reform movement. (Strong Josiah, 1885) To the Anglo-Saxon historians, who were sceptical of the efficiency (This is one of the favourite terms for the Progressives.) and necessity for saving the black race for the progress of civilisation, DuBois resorts to a contrapuntal reading of Anglo-Saxon history:

A thousand years ago such an assumption, easily possible would have made it difficult for the Teuton to prove the right to life. Two thousand years ago such dogmatism, readily welcome, would have scouted the idea of blond races ever leading civilisation. So woefully unorganised is sociological knowledge that the meaning of progress of “swift” and “slow” in human doing, and the limits of human perfectibility are veiled, unanswered sphinxes on the shores of science.

The finale of Dubois’s argument is that like other races, the Negro race must be given an opportunity to perform on the stage of American history and that of the world invoking historical precedence of the Blacks to the American land and evidence of economic and spiritual of their contributions to American civilisation:

Your country? How came it yours? Before the Pilgrims landed we were here. Here we have brought our three gifts and mingled them with yours: a gift of story and song […]; the gift of sweat and brawn to beat back the wilderness, conquer the
soil and lay the foundations of this vast economic empire [...] the third, a "gift of the Spirit." Around us the history of the land has centred for thrice a hundred years; out of the nation’s heart we have called all that was best to throttle and subdue all that was worst. [...] Nor has our gift of the Spirit been merely passive. Actively we have woven ourselves with the warp and woof of this nation. [...] Are not these gifts worth the giving? Is not this work and striving? Would America have been America without her Negro people? (p.387)

The problem for the Negro, as DuBois sees it, is to discover and deliver the message of his/her race. It is a problem because “the full, complete Negro message of the whole Negro race has not yet been given to the world.” In *The Souls of Black Folk*, DuBois gives some indications as to the nature of this message. To the question as to how the message will be developed, DuBois answers that it will be done by the “development of these race groups, not as individuals, but as races”; races understood in socio-cultural rather than in biological terms. At a time when nineteenth and early twentieth centuries America had officially adopted the Zangwillian idea of melting pot, DuBois advocates a "cultural pluralism" under the guise of race. (Cf. O’Callaghan, 2007) He affirms that the destiny of the Negroes is not assimilation of “servile imitation of Anglo-Saxon culture, but a stalwart originality which shall unswervingly follow Negro ideals.” He also writes that “in this merging [the Negro] wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanise America, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world”. (p.215)

As a historicist, DuBois does not confine himself by setting the history of the American Negro within the context of the grand narrative that Hegel calls world history. He also reflects on short periods of Negro history like the Civil War and the Reconstruction. For example, in the second part of the first chapter (Of Our Spiritual Strivings) and the second chapter “Of the Dawn of Freedom”, he considers the Hegelian journey of the Negro toward self-consciousness over a period of forty years that changed the Negro all the way “from the child of emancipation to the youth of dawning consciousness” (p. 218) characterised by the quest for the ballot and political power during the Reconstruction. The next stage of growth
was marked by the race’s adolescent desire for book-learning especially during the Post-Reconstruction period which climaxes with the Black man’s coming to age as “a co-worker in the kingdom of culture.” As one of the co-workers in the kingdom of culture, DuBois emerges basically as both a historicist and a cultural critic and theorist. In conclusion, we can say that DuBois’s *The Souls of Black Folk* anticipates Frantz Fanon’s *Black Skin White Mask* in its redeployment of Hegelian themes and methodology in defence of a racially non-exclusive humanity and humanism.
References


